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ABSTRACT
This article surveys recent work on forecasting realignments and estimating the credibility of
target zones. The literature finds that realignments are somewhat predictable from readily
available information such as interest rates and position of the exchange rate within the band.
The relationship between realignment expectations and macrovariables is weak and uncertain.
Realignments are said to “surprise” policy makers and market participants; they can only be
predicted a short time before they happen. Further work on the formation ofexpectations would
be an important contribution to future research in this area. Additionally, the role of the U.S.
dollar in ERM realignments is often noted but has not yet been incorporated into the estimation
techniques.
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St. Louis, MO 63102Chief Witch: Yes, that’s right.
MacBeth: I understand you can foretell the future.
-- From a BBC Radio Program, June 1968
During the French revolution such people were known as agioteurs (speculators) -- and they
were guillotined.
-- Michel Sapin, French Minister of Finance, speaking of currency traders1
1. INTRODUCTION
Since March 1979, most ofthe nations of the European Union have participated in a
“target zone” system of exchange rate management known as the Exchange Rate Mechanism
(ERM) ofthe EuropeanMonetary System (EMS). Although the target zones of the ERM
have weathered many adjustments since their inception, speculative currency attacks in
September 1992, and August 1993, led to the de facto suspensionof the system. The
United Kingdom and Italy suspended their participation in the ERM on September 17, 1992.
After August 1993, the bands were broadened sufficiently to functionally alter the character
of the system. These recent crises have focused attention on the stability of not only the
ERM, but of target zone systems generally.
A target zone is a hybrid exchange rate regime, a compromise betweenfloating and
completely fixed exchange rates. In a target zone system, monetary authorities pledge to
1 The Christian Science Monitor, Wednesday, September 30, 1992.
1keep the exchange rate with a particular foreign currency, or basket ofcurrencies, within
given margins around a central parity. At times, the authorities may also choose to realign
the central parity. Advocates argue that target zones blend the advantages of fixed exchange
rates and flexible exchange rate systems.2 Krugman and Miller (1992) point out that the
original justification for constraining EMS exchange rates within target zones was to reduce
exchange rate volatility which contributes to uncertainty and risk in international trade and
investment.3 More recently, a desire to “borrow” the low inflation reputation of a foreign
central bank (e.g. the Bundesbank) has been frequently cited as an advantage of target zones.
Compared to completely fixed rates, target zones allow central banks greater scope for
monetary independence.~ Paradoxically, the exercise of independence may contribute to
expectations of realignment which produce a “speculative attack,” in which speculators refuse
to hold one of the currencies at any exchange rate in the target zone. A successful
speculative attack necessitates a realignment of the central parity, thus thwarting the goal of
stability of the exchange rate.~
2 See Corbae, Ingramand Mondino (1990) fora theoreticaldevelopmentofonejustification
for target zones.
~ Engel and Hakkio (1993) and Neely (1993) study the volatility of exchange rates under
target zones from different perspectives.
~In this context, independence means freedom to use monetary policy for internal, rather
than external goals. The limits of this type of monetary independence in a target zone are
explored by Kool (1993).
~ The theoretical literature on speculative attacks on fixed exchange rate systems is well
developed. Salant and Henderson (1978), Flood and Garber (1984) and Obstfeld (1984 and
1986) have made important contributions.
2Researchers would like to understand the circumstances associated with speculative
attacks and the realignments of central parities within a target zone for several reasons. If
financial market participants could forecast realignments, they could profit from the large
changes in asset prices. For example, it is estimated that investor George Soros made one
billion dollars speculating against the pound and the lira as a result of the crisis of 1992.
Monetary authorities have a different rationale for analyzing realignments, they wish to be
able to manage the economy more effectively. Ideally, they would like to maintain stable
exchange rates and low inflation while also retaining sufficient monetary flexibility to
conduct countercyclical stabilizationpolicy. Although there is no consensus on the
microeconomic benefits ofexchange rate stability versus the macroeconomic benefits of
domestic stabilization policy, realignments produce uncertainty about the value of
internationally held assets/investments which policymakers would like to avoid.
Economists have had little success in forecasting exchange rates at short horizons.
Yet, there is evidence (Mizrach (1993c)) that we can forecasttarget zone realignments over a
short interval using information from interest rates inflation and the position of the exchange
rate in the target zone. This article surveys the recent research on forecasting realignments
and estimating the credibility of target zones. To facilitate understanding of the functioning
of exchange rate target zones, the next section of this article presents a simple monetary
model of exchange rate determination. Section three discusses the functioning of target zone
systems. The empirical literature on realignments and credibility of target zones is surveyed
in section four. The literature suggests that market participants have systematically incorrect
exchange rate policy expectations. Further, the limits to the forecastability of realignments
3are also examined. Rose and Svensson (1993) conclude that realignment expectations are
only weakly related to macroeconomic variables and realignments “take markets by
surprise.” Finally, section five summarizes the conclusions of the literature and suggests
future research.
2. EXCHANGE RATE DETERMINATION
Target zones are created to stabilize exchange rates. It is necessary to understand
exchange rates and the market forces that determine them to understand the forces behind
realignments of target zones. To give the reader an idea of what an exchange rate within a
target zone looks like, the top ofFigure 1 depicts the log of the deutsche mark per franc
exchange rate from March 1979 to July 1993. As the relative price of money, the exchange
rate is determined by market “fundamentals,” that is, output, price levels, money supplies
and interest rates. Inthe short run, uncovered interest parity (UIP) is thought to control
exchange rates. In the long run, theory suggests that the relative prices of goods determine
exchange rates, through purchasing power parity (PPP).
2.1 Uncovered Interest Parity
Markets for financial instruments have low transactions costs and very good
information, small changes in expected asset returns cause large movements of capital.
Expected asset returns drive exchange rate movements because investors exchange currencies
to purchase foreign financial instruments or repatriate earnings from international
investments. So small changes in expected asset returns cause large movements of capital.
4For example, if French interest rates exceed those of Germany, a German investor
might choose to exchange deutsche marks for francs at the current exchange rate, buy French
financial assets (such as government bonds) that pay a higher interest rate and then
repurchase deutsche marks with the francs when the bond matures.
Of course, if French bonds pay a higher interest rate, why would any investor choose
to buy German bonds? The answer is that there are two forms of returns from international
investments, the return on the investment itself and the return on the exchange rate.
Generally speaking, the expected return for international assets should be the same for all
assets~6 A simple example illustrates the manner in which the asset returns and expected
exchange rate movements interact.
The expected gross return in deutsche marks for a German investor who invests DM
1000 in German bonds during period t, for r years, compounded annually, is simply
(1) Expected gross return for investing in
German Bonds = 1000( 1 + i~ )~
6 This is, of course, a simplification. A more accurate statement would be that the after
tax risk-adjusted return for different assets must be the same. Koedijk and Kool (1993b)
compare the profitability of investment strategies in different ERM currencies.
5where i~is the annual rate of interest on a Germanbond .‘ Ifthe same investor exchanged
deutsche marks for francs, bought and held French bonds, then exchanged the earning in
francs for deutsche marks his expected gross return would be:
Expected gross return for investing in
French Bonds = 1000 ~( 1 +~ ~E~(e~+~)
(2)
= 1000~(1 + i~)C.( E~[—~-} )
e~
For variables that are always positive, such as exchange rates, it is usually easier to
work with the logs of the variables, rather than the variables themselves. Definethe log of
the expected return on the exchange rate (deutsche marks per franc) from period “t” to
period “t+r” by8
(3) E~[z~s~+~] ln(E~[~-~tL])= In(E~[e~÷j) - ln(e~).
~ Ifit were not necessary to consider intervals other than a year, r could be set equal to 1
for simplicity.
8 We will take advantage of the fact that for - .2 < x < .2, a reasonable approximation
is ln(1+x) x. Animmediate application of this is ln( 1 + j~~e) ~Ge This means that for
small percentage changes, the log difference of a variable is approximately the percentage
change in the variable. Define s~ = ln(e~). Using the approximations and the definitions,
[(e~÷1/e~) - 1] ln(e~+1/e~) = ln(e~+1) - ln(e~)= s~+~ - s~ =
6For expected returns to be equalized, a higher French interest rate must be offset by an
expected depreciation in the exchange rate (fewer deutsche marks per franc in the future).
If nominal interest rates are not too large, equating the right hand sides of equations (1) and
(2) and using definition (3) gives us an approximation to the expectation of the exchange
rate change next period:
(4) E~ [As~±~ 3 .Ge — i~FT
where T is the number of years per period. If the periods are months, for instance, 1~=
1/12. This relationship is called “uncovered interest parity” (UIP) .~ Nations with
consistently high inflation rates tend to have higher nominal interest rates (to compensate
investors for loss of purchasing power) and depreciating currencies.
Empirical studies have failed to find much support for the UIP hypothesis among
flexible exchange rate systems (Froot and Thaler (1990)). This may be due to unrealistic
assumptions. UIP assumes that investors are risk neutral when, in fact, there seem to be
time-varying risk premia in the data. Also, there are frequently capital controls in the real
world that prevent investors from adjusting their portfolios in response to changes in interest
rates or expected exchange rates. Despite the factthat it has a poor record of empirical
support among flexible exchange rate systems, UIP is a useful way of thinking about target
~ If we were to repeat this example from the point of view of a French investor, we would
find an analogous UIP condition which, together with (1) and (2), would imply that E~[1/z~s~+~}
= l/E~[~s~+~]. Since, in general, E~[1/~s~+~] 1/E~[~s~+~], UIP cannot hold simultaneously
in discrete time for two currencies. This is known as Siegel’s paradox. Siegel’s paradox was
shown to be irrelevant in empirical work by McCulloch (1975).
7zone exchange rates. In contrastto previous studies on flexible rate systems, Mizrach
(1993a) finds support for UIP in well integrated capital markets of the ERM.
2.2 Purchasing Power Parity
One can buy goods and services as well as financial assets with money. A higher
price level in France means that one can buy fewer goods with a given quantity of francs;
each franc is less valuable. PPP says the exchange rate will adjust downwards to reflect
higherprices. That is, if France maintains a 10 percent higher inflation rate than Germany,
its exchange rate will depreciate 10 percent per year in the long run.
A variable useful for measuring changes in relative purchasing power is called the




where P~’~ and ~ denote the price levels in France and Germany in period t, and e~
denotes the nominal exchange rate in that period. An increase in the real exchange rate
means that the franc becomes more valuable, imports will be cheaper to French consumers
but the price of French exports to Germany rises. French goods will become less
competitive on the world market. If PPP holds, the real exchange rate will tend to be mean
reverting; it will tend to return to some constant level.’0 Empirically, evidence supporting
10 Roughly speaking, a random variable, such as the real exchange rate, that can be
forecasted accurately far into the future is said to be “mean reverting.”
8PPP is limited, however PPP remains useful for thinking about long-run tendencies in
exchange rates. ~
Both UIP and PPP suggest that a nation which has a consistently more expansionary
monetary policy will have a currency that will tend to depreciate. The depreciation will
occur through the inflation-premium built into the nominal interest rate according to UIP and
through rising prices of domestic goods which will require that the home currency lose value
relative to foreign currencies to keep the real exchange rate constant, according to PPP.
3. TARGET ZONEEXCHANGE RATE SYSTEMS
A target zone is a hybrid exchange rate regime, a compromise between managed
floating and completely fixed exchange rates. In a managed float, monetary authorities may
or may not, at their discretion, intervene to control the rate of exchange. If monetary
authorities fix the exchange rate, they willingly buy or sell their own currency in unlimited
quantities at the fixed rate. A target zone exchange rate system has elements of each.
Monetary authorities pledge to intervene in the market to keep the domestic exchange rate
with a particular foreign currency, or basket of currencies, within narrow margins around a
central parity. In fact, the nature of central bank intervention defines a target zone.
~ Barriers to trade, transportation costs, differing baskets of goods across countries,
imperfect competition, non-traded goods and differentiated goods may all contribute to
weakening the effects of PPP. For an investigation of PPP within the EMS see Edison and
Fisher (1991). Coughlin and Koedijk (1990) review the literature on the determination ofthe
real exchange rate in the long run. Dueker (1993) investigates PPP with the more recent
econometric technique of fractional integration.
9Realignments occur when central banks are unwilling (or find it too costly) to conduct the
interventions necessary to preserve the target zone. Understanding realignments depends on
understanding the nature and consequences of central bank intervention.
3.2 TheERM
The ERM has operated since March 1979 to prevent the what was perceived to be
the excessive volatility in exchange rates that had prevailed in the 1970’s.12 The target
zones for each currency were initially established at ±2.25 percent around the bilateral
central parities for most of the currencies, ± 6 percent for the more volatile currencies such
as the Italian lira, Spanish peseta, British pound and Portuguese escudo, for at least some
periods.
It is common to divide the period of the ERM into three sub-periods. The first period
extends from the inception ofthe ERM in March 1979 until the end of 1983. The target
zones were characterized by lack ofcredibility and frequent devaluations during this period.
The second period lasted from 1984 to the end of 1991 and coincided with increasing
confidence in the ERM and greater convergence in the economic fundamentals of the
member nations. Figure 1 illustrates four devaluations of the French franc relative to the
deutsche mark in the first period and only two in the second period.13 It was widely
12 For more information on the history and practices of the EMS, see Fratianni (1988),
Ungerer, Hauvonen, Lopez-Claros, and Mayer (1990), Zurlinden (1993), Edison and Fisher
(1991), Bean (1992) and Higgins (1993).
13 The datain Figure 1 ends shortly before the widening ofthe target zones to ±15 percent
for all rates except the guilder/deutsche mark in August 1993 which was a de facto realignment
and the practical suspension of the system. See Zurlinden(1993) for a full description of the
i0thought in 1989 and 1990 that the target zones had become permanent and would never be
realigned but would simply lead into monetary union, a system of permanently fixed
exchange rates with one monetary authority. This would effectively meanone currency.
Events would prevent this smooth transition.
The third period for the system was the time leading to the crises and suspension of
the system. German unification and the recession in Europe are widely accepted as the
underlying causes of the crises of September 1992 and August 1993.14 Reunification
opened up major investment opportunities in the undeveloped East, increasing the demand for
deutsche marks and required the German government to spend a great of money to subsidize
the East and bring itup to western standards. The government also agreed to convert East
German ostmarks to West German deutsche marks on a very generous 1:1 basis.15 This
one-time expansion of the money supply meant that the Bundesbank would have to pursue
tight money for years to maintain low inflation. The loose German fiscal policy coupled
with tight monetary policy to contain inflation led to high German interest rates. This one-
time expansion of the money supply raised fears of inflation. High German interest rates put
upward pressure on the deutsche mark. At the same time, a recession was ravaging Europe,
striking Britain and Italy particularly hard.
evolution of the bilateral central parities in the ERM.
14 Higgins (1993) and Zurlinden (1993) examine the events leading to the collapse of the
ERM in more detail.
15 The exchange ofdeutschemarks for ostmarks was not unlimited on a 1:1 basis. Bofinger
(1990) provides a more detailed account of these events.
11The textbook monetary prescription for recession is expansion of the money supply
and lower interest rates. Unfortunately, monetary contraction/higher interest rates in
Germany and expansion/lower interest rates in the rest of Europe were incompatible with the
target zone system. The growing likelihood of appreciation ofthe deutsche mark made it
undesirable to hold securities denominated in overvalued currencies such as lira or pound
sterling without a sizeable interest ratepremium to compensate for the devaluation risk.
Pressure mounted on the Bank of England and the Bank of Italy to lower interest rates to
fight their recessions, while the Bundesbank resisted lowering money market interest rates
due to fearof inflation. Further, the Danish rejection of the Maastricht treaty in June 1992
put the European Monetary Union (EMU) in jeopardy. This was the catalyst for the
speculative attack of September 1992, which drove the British pound and the Italian lira from
the ERM.16 The pressure mounted over the next year as speculation against the remaining
weaker currencies continued. Finally, in August 1993, the ERM was effectively suspended
as bilateral bands were widened from± 2.25 percent to ±15percent for all the rates except
the Dutch guilder/deutsche mark rate.
4. THE CREDIBILITY OF TARGET ZONES: FORECASTING REALIGNMENTS
This section surveys the research on realignments oftarget zones conducted in the last
several years. This literature has focused on a number of related issues such as the
16 See Zurlinden (1993) for a detailed description of the experiences of the British pound
in the ERM.
12credibility of a particular target zone, the probability of a realignment and the expected size
of a realignment.
Economists have had little success in forecasting financial variables such as exchange
rates.’7 Target zone exchange rates may be different, however. Central banks manage
exchange rates to promote full employment or low inflation or some other economic goal;
they do not conduct monetary policy for profit. Knowledge of economic variables may be
used to forecast their policies. Expectations that the monetary authorities will prefer to
realign rather than defend the target zone will lead investors to demand an interest rate
premium to hold the weak currency. Therefore, clear expectations of a devaluation will be
accompanied by a high interest rate differential between the currencies.’8
4.1 The Simplest Test of Target Zone Credibility
This test is constructed to evaluate a weak currency that is expected to stay the same
or depreciate. Recall that we developed a forecast for expected future exchange rate changes
based on interest rate differentials called “uncovered interest parity” (UIP)
(6) E~[i~s~÷~] ~~Ge — i~FT
~ There is a good reason for this. If someone could predict the future movement of an
asset price (e.g. an unusual increase in a stock price) based on public information, that person
would borrow money to buy as much stock as possible immediately, driving the price up right
away. This is a simple version of the “efficient markets hypothesis.” If price changes could
be easily anticipated, they would already have happened.
18 There are other methods for determining the credibility of target zones, such as those
in Koedijk and Kool (1993b), but this article will focus on those methods using interest rate
differentials.
13The intuition behind equation (6) is that investors must be compensated by a higher interest
rate for holding assets denominated in a currency that is expected to lose value (depreciate).
In a target zone, the most that the exchange rate could depreciate without a
realignment is the distance from the exchange rate to the lower bound. Denote this distance
in percentage terms (it must be a non positive number):
(7)
where e is the lower bound of the target zone, ~ = ln@) and s~ = ln(e~). If the target zone
is perfectly credible (no probability of a realignment), the expected depreciation in the
exchange rate can be no greater than the distance from the exchange rate to the bottom of the
band. That is, for all period lengths we must have
(8) E~[As~+,] c1~
In a perfectly credible target zone, at a forecast horizon of length (1/r), we must have
19\ .Ge .Fr
‘ / r~(z~ — ~ )
As r goes to zero, that is, as the forecast horizon becomes arbitrarily short, equation (9)
must hold; the right hand side is less than or equal to zero and the left side is going to zero.
14Ifequation (9) fails to hold, we can conclude the target zone is not perfectly credible;
devaluation is considered possible.’9
Formal tests of target zone credibility or realignment probabilities are usually based
on the UIP relation and incorporate information about interest rate differentials. The greater
the risk of devaluation, the higher the difference in interest rates. An example of the relation
between exchange rates and interest rate differentials is shown in Figure 1. The top panel
shows the time series of the exchange rate with the devaluations and the bottom panel shows
the corresponding series of the French 3 month interest rates minus German 3 month interest
rates.2° The interest rate differential was almost always greater than 0; the expectation
was always that the French franc would depreciate. The bottom half of Figure 1 shows
interest rate differentials tend to widen before realignments (vertical lines).
Figure 2 displays the time series of the deutsche mark per franc exchange rate within
the target zone minus the adjusted three month interest rate differential. This series is
equivalent to the guaranteed excess return from investing in French securities over German
securities conditional on the band remaining intact. In the notation used above, it is
19 The converse is not true, however. If equation (9) does hold, that does not show that
the target zone is perfectly credible. It may be, or it may not be. There could be significant
realignment expectations with (9) still holding. For example, suppose that the deutsche mark
per franc rate is currently at central parity so d, = - 2.25 percent, i~ = 4 percent and i~=
2 percent. Further, investors know it to be equally likely that either there will be no realignment
and the exchange rate will be exactly the same a year (r = 1) from now or that there will be
a realignment and the exchange rate will be exactly 3 percent lower. That means that in this
case equation (8) and equation (9) would hold but the target zone is not perfectly credible since
there is a5 0percent chance of a devaluation (realignment downwards).




This variable indicates a lackof credibility at the three month horizon for the target zone
when it is greater than zero. This is the “simplest test” of target zone credibility. Thus,
Figure 2 shows the target zone lacked credibility most of the time in the early 1980’s,
gradually falling below zero later in the decade as French inflation fell.
In “The Simplest Test of Target Zone Credibility” Lars Svensson (1991) uses
equation (9) to examine if interest rates were high enough to conclude that there must be
some devaluation expectation for the Swedish target zone from 1987 to 1990. The data are
monthly. During the period of Svensson’s study, Sweden had a unilateral target zone with a
trade weighted “basket” (or weighted average) of the currencies of its 15 largest trading
partners. Hence, the relevant exchange rate is now measured in basket units per krona and
the respective interest rates are also in basket units and krona. The width ofthe band was
1.5 percent during this period. Svensson plots the return available on domestic securities
(for 12 month maturities) against the maximal return (in Swedish krona) on the weighted
basket of foreign securities assuming the target zone would remain intact. He found the
Swedish target zone lacked credibility with the ECU for securities with a 12 month horizon
from the third quarter of 1989 until the end of the sample in 1990.
164.2 Uncovered Interest Parity
The hypothesis of UIP is used to investigate credibility in the same way as the
“simplest test.” Recall that UIP expressed the expected movement in (basket units per
Swedish krona) exchange rates as:
(11) E~ [A S~] = ~ .Basket — i~’~’)
This expression is also called the expected rate of devaluation. By using the interest rates for
securities of different maturities, Svensson is able to construct a series of forecasts for the
future value of the exchange rate. For example, the forecast for the exchange rate in two
years was constructed using the 24 month Euro-currency interest rates for the basket of
currencies and the Swedish krona in equation (11) to get the expected change in the weighted
exchange rate over that period. If the forecasted exchange rate fell outside the target zone
for a particular maturity at a point in time, the target zone was said to lack credibility at that
forecast horizon.
Svensson used maturities of 12, 24 and 60 months over the sample period to conclude
that while the market generally found the Swedish target zone to be credible in the short run,
there was strong evidence that the market also always believed that devaluation within a
longer horizon (24 to 60 months) was a distinct possibility. The expected exchange rates
always fell outside the target zone for those maturities for the sample period.
174.3 Mean Reversion Within the Target Zone
A major problem with using UIP to estimate the credibility of target zones is that it
predicts movements in the exchange rate, not the central parity. The movement of the
exchange rate within the band, especially at short horizons, could account for much or all of
the interest rate differential. At longer horizons, the interest yield for securities gets larger
(as more interest accrues over time) but the exchange rate within the band is still bounded.
For example, if the target zone is 2.25 percent wide (as were the ERM target zones before
August 1993) and the exchange rate is at central parity, the simplest test tells us that the
interest rate differential on 12 month securities would have to exceed 2.25 percentage points
(the width of the band) before we could reject the idea that the target zone is perfectly
credible. But, the same test tells us the annualized interest differential for 3 month securities
would have to exceed 9 percentage points before we could reach the same conclusion.2’
To more accurately estimate the credibility of the target zone, at short horizons, it is
necessary to estimate the movement of the exchange rate within the band. Investigating this
matter, Rose and Svensson (1991) find that daily deutsche mark per franc rates within the
band tend to be “mean reverting,”that is, they tend to come back to central parity if they are
away from it. The mean reversion is due to the fact that monetary authorities will usually
defend the target zone by intervening to move the exchange rate back to the center of the
target zone if it approaches the edges.
21 (12/3)*.0225 = .09
18To explain how movement of the exchange rate within the band is forecasted, define
the log of the position of the exchange rate within the band as
(12) x,~= s,~ — c~,
where c~ is the log of the central parity of the band at time t. Note that x~ may be positive or
negative. Ofcourse, one may rewrite the exchange rate as the sum of the central parity and
the position within the band
(13) s~=x~÷c~,
and by taking differences (percentage changes) of this equation over time we get
(14) As~= Ax~+
Using the UIP condition stated earlier and rearranging terms we may express the expected
change in central parities (the expected realignment) as
(15) E~[Ac~+~] = t .(~B0~1~ — i~~) — E~[Ax~÷~]
Equation (15) illustrates that to more accurately predict changes in the central parity
(realignments) it is necessary to predict the way exchange rates might move within the band.
Rose and Svensson (1991) make the additional assumption that the future movements
of the exchange rate within the band might be predicted from present position and other
19ERM exchange rates with the deutsche mark. They use the following ordinary least squares
regression to predict the changes in the exchange rate within the band for the next month.22
AX~~22 2 3
=~ ~30~h1
+ p1’x~~~ + P3~x~ +
(16) At i=1
j~1 ~ + k=1 ~k ~xk~+ t÷22
They find that future changes in the exchange rate are dominated by current position within
the band. That is, fi, is negative and statistically significant. Other variables were found to
be statistically or economically insignificant.
Equation (16) gives Rose and Svensson (1991) an estimate for E~[ Ax~+22]. In order to
predict the rate of expected realignment E~[ Ac~+22]they substitute this expression into (15) to
get an estimable equation. They estimate equation (17) by regressing the actual realignments
(Ac~+22) on the interest rate differentials and E~[ Ax~+22].
(17) A c~4~22
= iIJ~+ II’,.t .(~Ge — .Fr ~ + *2Ev [Ax~22]
The test of the overall UIP model (~i’~ = 0, ~‘, == 1) is rejected at the relatively low
marginal significance level of 8.6 percent. Rose and Svensson considered this encouraging
given the poor empirical performance of exchange rate models. Nevertheless, they are
22 Inequation (16), Ax1~22
= x~+22
- x, (there are 22 business days in a month). The forecast
horizon is At = 1/ 12 of a year. The dummy variable h~= 1 for the period of the ith central
parity, h, = 0 otherwise, i = 1, 2. . .7. The bilateral deutsche mark rates with the 5 other
members of the ERM during this period are denoted xk~,k = 1. . .5.
20disturbed by the fact that the hypothesis that only the interest rate differential matters (‘42 =
0) is rejected only at the high marginal significance level of 22 percent. They conclude that
they are able to predict realignments “with some success,” but suggest that it is possible that
private agents may not anticipate realignments very well. Since their model is based on
market expectations - high interest rate differentials - misprediction by private agents may
degrade its performance.
4.4 Expectations
The question of why private agents may fail to anticipate realignments is puzzling to
economists. Kaminsky (1993) attributes this lack of success in predicting exchange rate
movements in general to the fact that agents must “learn” about the nature of the economy
and the behavior of the monetary authorities. While they are learning, they may make
systematic mistakes about the credibility of the authorities or the nature of shocks hitting the
economy. The question of how private agents develop their expectations and beliefs about
the economy is an important one. If central banks knew how to influence expectations of
devaluation, they could prevent speculative attacks and stabilize the exchange rate.
The UIP relation tells us something about expectations; interest rate differentials
forecast expected movement, but the story is not as simple as that presented in section two.
Investors care not only about expected profit, but also about minimizing risk associated with
the profit. For instance, German investors buying domestic bonds are sure of their nominal
return, but if they buy French bonds, they must also take the risk that exchange rates will not
move as predicted. If the exchange rate depreciates more than expected, they lose money.
21Because of this risk, investors require a “risk premium” in the form of an especially high
interest rate to hold certain currencies. This risk premium may also change over time as
economic conditions change and investors perceive more or less risk in the exchange rate.
This time-varying risk premium makes it difficult to accurately estimate expectations from
interest rate differentials.
An obvious way to investigate agents’ expectations about the exchange rate is to ask
them. Frankel and Phillips (1991) use this method to investigate the hypothesis of increasing
EMS credibility after 1987 (until 1991). With the survey data method from the Currency
Forecasters’ Digest (CFD) as well as the UIP method, Frankel and Phillips (1991) examine
whether forecasts of future exchange rates fall within the target zone for monthly EMS
exchange rates. They consider the main advantage of survey data to be immunity from
error due to exchange rate risk premia. The closer is the forecast to the central parity, the
more credible is the target zone.23 Prior to 1990, estimates of the expected annual rates of
devaluation were about 2-5 percent for most currencies. These estimates tended to
overpredict actual devaluations. Their study concludes that between 1987 and 1991 the
EMS experienced a significant gain in credibility using one year and five yearhorizons.
That is, one year and five year ahead forecasts of the exchange rate move much closer to
current central parity after 1987.
UIP and survey data approaches are useful to inform us as to the expectations of
market participants with respect to the exchange rate, but they do not tell us how these
expectations are formed. Using Swedish data from 1982 to 1991, Lindberg, Svensson and
23 Their methods are very similar to Svensson’s “simplest test” discussed above.
22Söderlind (1991) consider this problem of explaining time-varying market devaluation
expectations in terms of underlying factors. They first use a variant of the “simplest test” to
compute devaluation expectations over time for 1, 3, 6 and 12 month forecast horizons.
Generally, they were unable to find much incidence of a lack of credibility at short forecast
horizons 24
Lindberg, Svensson and Söderlind (1991) attribute the failure to find a lack of
credibility at shorter horizons to ignoring expected changes within the band. As discussed in
the context ofmean reversion, changes within the band may be large relative to interest rate
differentials at short horizons. To get more precise estimates of devaluation expectations,
they required a specification for future values of the exchange rate. Theory suggested




Although, they considered a variety of explanatory variables and methods to estimate
equation (18) and its variants, a simple OLS regression with a Newey-West correction for
conditional heteroskedasticity to the errors worked best for estimating changes within the
band. The gains to precision were described as “substantial” for short horizons.
With the new devaluation expectations series, Lindberg, Svensson and Söderlind
(1991) examine the circumstances around 4 specific periods of high realignment expectations.
The first period, October 1982 was the only time that the target zone was actually realigned.
24 There was a lackofcredibility at all horizons before the only actual devaluation (October,
1982) and around the time of an election (September 1985). In addition, the target zone
frequently lacked credibility at the 12 month forecast horizon.
23The market seemed to have weakly anticipated it two to three months before it occurred.
The high realignment expectations in the spring of 1985 were ascribed to the electionof a
new government and uncertainty about the width of the band.25 The third period of high
realignment expectations was also associated with political events, the political crisis and
weak economy of the first three quarters of 1990. Finally, high realignment expectations in
the late fall of 1990 were also imputed to fears that the government would change the target
zone before the general electionof September 1991.
In a more formal investigation ofhow expectations are formed by political events and
macrovariables, Lindberg, Svensson and Söderlind (1991) regressed devaluation expectations
on variables such as changes in the real exchange rate, parliamentary elections, changes in
foreign exchange reserves, unemployment, money growth, government borrowing and the
current account. Only changes in the real exchange rate, parliamentary elections and the
current account proved to be significant explanatory variables. The coefficients on these
significant explanatory variables were unstable over subperiods, however, perhaps indicating
the shifting focus of market participants as they develop their expectations.
Rose and Svensson (1993) extended the efforts to learn about the causes and behavior
of realignment expectations during the EMS. They regressed realignment expectations on
measures of relative money, output, the real exchange rate, inflation, the trade balance,
reserves and exchange rate volatility within the band. They found no robust linkbetween
realignment expectations and the macroeconomic variables. Use of a vector autoregressive
system had no more success. They conclude that there is “no apparent relationship between
25 The width of the target zone was not public information at this time.
:24macroeconomic variables and credibility.” Principal factor analysis indicated that EMS
credibility is largely joint.
After examining the behavior of macroeconomic variables and political events before
the currency crises of 1992 and 1993, Rose and Svensson find it difficult to convincingly
explain the cause and suddenness of the crises. Although it is easy to claim ex post that the
macroeconomic fundamentals dictated a revaluation of the deutsche mark, “it remains a
mystery why the deepest financial markets in the world yielded so remarkably few
indications of an imminent crisis.” Further, the weak linkbetween realignment expectations
and macroeconomic variables is troubling.
4.5 Truncated Data
An often ignored problem in working with data from target zone exchange rate
systems is that the data are “truncated.” This is a problem for statistical research on this
data; much commonly used statistical theory assumes the distribution ofthe random variable
to be unbounded. Chen and Giovannini (1992) suggest transforming the exchange rate into




where L = ln(e/c~),e is the upper edge and c~ is the central parity of the target zone.
Careful inspection of equation (18) reveals that as the exchange rate (er) approaches the top
25of the band (e), z~ approaches oo and as e~ approaches the bottom of the band (~), z~
approaches - 00.
Working with the transformed random variable z~,Chen and Giovannini investigate
target zone credibility in the usual ways using monthly data from the ERM and the Bretton-
Woods system.26 They follow Rose and Svensson in linearly predicting the “mean
reversion” of the exchange rate within the target zone and using this to estimate band
credibility from the UIP relationship. They point out that their confidence intervals for the
expected changes within the band are actually constrained by the band (by construction)
whereas the confidence intervals for the untransformed variables frequently fall outside the
target zone. The effect is especially pronounced for the narrower target zones of the
Bretton-Woods system. This property rules out nonsensical values for expected changes
within the band and means a better estimation of the process. As in other studies, they are
able to frequently reject perfect credibility for ERM zones during the 1980’s.
4.6 Conclusions of the “Simplest Test” Literature
The conclusions of this part ofthe literature are nicely outlined in the following six
points enumerated by Bertola and Svensson (1993):
1. Mean reversion (the tendency to come back to the center) within the band is
strong and often of same magnitude as interest rate differentials.
2. Current position within the band (x’) is the dominant factor in forecasting
future changes within the band.
26 While generally described as an adjustable peg fixed rate system, the Bretton-Woods
system is more accurately described as a narrow target zone system. The target zones were ±
1 percent around dollar parities.
263. For maturities of 1-12 months a linear specification is usually adequate to
describe this mean reversion.
4. There are time varying rates of estimated devaluation expectations.
5. Estimated expected rates of devaluation (E~[Ac~+ ~]) predict actual devaluations
to some extent.
6. Estimated expected rates ofdevaluation are correlated with some
macroeconomic variables.
4.7 The Probability and Size ofRealignment
The “simplest test” of target zone credibility only predicts the expected rate of
devaluation (E~,[AsJ)over a period of time. It does not predict the probability of
realignment over that period, nor does it predict the size of a realignment conditional on one
occurring. That is, the “simplest test” is unable to differentiate between an almost certain
small realignment and a low probability of a large realignment.
Recently, work has been done by Mizrach (1993b and 1993c) to estimate the
probability of a realignment and the expected size, He begins by pointing out that the
expected movement ofthe exchange rate may be decomposed into its movement with a
realignment and without a realignment. If the probability of a realignment over period t
(Pj Ac~+,. 0]) is denoted by Pt then we may write the expected movement of the exchange
rate as
(20) E~[As~+~] = { (1 —ps) (E~[Ax~+~jj=0] + E~[Ac~÷~~j=0])
+ p~~(E~[Ax, Ij=1} + E~[Ac~+~ij=1]) }
27The notation [j = 1] denotes conditioning the variable on a realignment of the central parity.
Li = 03 denotes conditioning the variable on no realignment of the central parity. Mizrach
uses the basic UIP relationship (equation (6), the fact that the expectation ofthe realignment
size, conditional on no realignment, is zero (i.e. E~[Ac~÷~ j = 01 = 0), and the identity
implied by equation (16) (E~[As~+7 j = 1] = Ej Ax~+~j = 1] + E~[Ac~+~~ j = 1]), to
rewrite equation (20) as:
(21) ~.(jGe — ~Fr) = { ~ )
+ p1.(E,[As~ Ij=l]) }
To estimate this equation, Mizrach makes several identifying assumptions about the
forms of the probability and the expectations. First, he estimates the probability of a
realignment (P~(Ac~+~ 0)) through a probit transformation. The probit transformation allows
the probability of a realignment to be in (0,1) depending on the log of the position ofthe
exchange rate within the band (xi) and the domestic yield curve, that is the difference
between the yield on 3 month and 12 month domestic bonds.27 The probability of a
realignment is
27 Ifa realignment is likely, the exchange rate will tend to go lower in the band and short
term interest rates will rise faster than longer term interest rates. Investors require extra
compensation for holding short term positions in a currency which may be devalued soon since
the expected rate of devaluation in the near future exceeds the long term expected rate of
devaluation. These factorsincrease v~the model estimates a higher probability ofrealignment.
28(22) p~(v~) P~(Ac~÷~ ~0 ) = f 1 exp(-.5 ~z2)dz,
~ ~/(2it)
where he parameterizes Vt (in the case of the deutsche mark per franc exchange rate) as
.Fr(3month) .Fr(l2month) k / v~= a0
+ a1x~+ a2(t~ — ) ~
Second, the log of the exchange rate within the band (xi) is modeled, as before, as a
linear autoregression; past values of x~ are used to predict future values. This is written as
(24) E~[Ax~÷~] =
Third, the expected size of an exchange rate movement, conditional upon a
realignment (E~,(As~j = 1)) is allowed to depend on the value of the real exchange rate (as
defined in section2) and a constant term
(25) E~[As~÷Jj=1] = P2
+ p3ln(rx~)
Recall that (assuming PPP) the long run equilibrium value of the exchange rate is determined
by relative price levels; the real exchange rate should tend to return to its equilibrium value.
Equation (25) incorporates this concept; the size of a realignment depends on how far out of
equilibrium the exchange rate is when the realignment occurs.
29Substituting the assumptions embodied in equations (23), (24) and (25) into equation
(21) and keeping in mind that Pt(Z) is givenby expression (22), equation (21) may be
estimated as
(26) .Ge — .Fr ~(l—p~(v~))f3,x~ ÷p~(v~)p2 ÷p~(v~)I33in(rx~) }
Nonlinear least squares were used to estimate the model on daily data from the ERM, the
FF/DM and IL/DM exchange rates. That is, he minimized the residual implied by
subtracting the right hand side of (4.21) from the left had side with respect to the ~3and a,
parameters.
(27) Mini,aE { (,Ge — ~Fr) — (1 —p~(v~)) . P1~ +p~(v~) . ~ +p~(v~) . ~33 •1n(rx~)
Mizrach found strong evidence of mean reversion within the band (f3, < 0). The
magnitudes of the parameter estimates are such that any deviation from central parity would
be expected to be cut in half in a week or two.
The model forecasts systematically larger realignments than actually occurred for
both the franc and the lira.
The probit parameters (a0, a,, and a2) all were significant and had the appropriate
sign. Beliefs about the probability of a realignment may be constructed from the parameters
of the probit model. It is found that typically, probabilities were at usual levels up until a
30month before a realignment and thenbegan climbing upwards. The short nature of the
warning time provided by the model leads Mizrach to conclude that realignments “surprised”
market participants and policy-makers. This is not surprising given the self-fulfilling nature
of speculative attacks upon target zones. Once realignment expectations develop, market
participants adjust their portfolios holdings away from the weak currency. This puts
additional pressure on the target zone.
Mizrach concludes that his model supports the hypotheses of mean reversion within
the band and produces credible estimates of time-varying realignment risk.
4.8 The Role of the Dollar
The empirical work discussed above does not use a potentially important indicator of
realignments, weakness in the U.S. dollar. As noted by Edison and Kole (1994) and others,
realignments tend to be associated with weakness in the U.S. dollar. The role of the dollar
and the deutsche mark as international stores of value is the explanation for this. When the
dollar is weak, investors substitute into deutsche mark denominated assets. This increases
the value of the deutsche mark not only with respect to the dollar but also with respect to
other ERM currencies. This added pressure in times of crisis has frequently contributed to
realignments.
315. CONCLUSIONS
This article has surveyed recent work on forecasting realignments and estimating the
credibility oftarget zones. The literature has found that realignments are predictable to
some extent within short intervals from readily available information such as interest rates
and position of the exchange rate within the band.
Most of the research surveyed here has taken the formation of expectations for
granted and has used interest rate differentials which develop from those expectations as
starting points for forecasting realignments. The relationship betweenrealignment
expectations and macrovariables is weak and uncertain. It is not clear how expectations are
formed. Further, realignments are said to “surprise” policy makers and market participants;
realignment expectations rise only a short time before realignments. To some extent, this is
to be expected. Although there are “false alarms” in which realignment expectations rise and
then fall back again, once realignments are seen as likely, speculative pressure builds up that
often results in a self-fulfilling speculative attack. Further work on the formation of
expectations would be an important contribution to future research in this area.
As pointed out by Krugman (1993), the microeconomic benefits of stable exchange
rates are not well understood, nor are the costs of subordinating domestic monetary policy to
the pursuit of exchange rate stability. Given these failings, it is difficult to formulate a
policy prescription for the maintenance of exchange rate target zones.
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Figure 2